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Abstract
The Australian Health Care Agreements for the five years 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2008 were signed
in August 2003 after vituperative debate and intransigence from the Commonwealth that vitiated
the negotiation process. The new Agreements, which were not as generous as the Agreements
they replaced, increase accountability on the States, requiring States to match increases in
Commonwealth funding, and de-emphasise the prospects for further reform in Commonwealth-
State relations during the course of the Agreements. This paper describes the new Australian
Health Care Agreements and the process which led to them.
Introduction
The most significant Australian health policy event for
2003 was the signing of the five-year Australian Health
Care Agreements. The Agreements were preceded by an
ultimatum to the States and Territories from the Com-
monwealth indicating that there would be no changes
from the offer on the table. This led to bitter political
recriminations, but the Agreements were eventually
signed.
In fact important preparations for Agreement renewal
occurred in April 2002 with the Commonwealth and State
Ministers, in a display of remarkable amity and accord,
endorsing a new approach to the Agreements that:
• Commonwealth/State relations in the health arena
should focus on the provision of optimal care and health
outcomes, regardless of jurisdictional boundaries.
• It is in the best interests of all Australians for the Com-
monwealth, Stats and Territories to work co-operatively to
improve the health and wellbeing of the community and
the way in which health services are provided;
• The 2003–08 Agreements should contain the principles,
objectives and proposed health outcomes designed to
achieve those objections.
The Ministers also agreed to establish nine reference
groups to address key issues in health reform which would
feed into the Agreement "negotiation" process [1]. The
reference groups addressed interaction between hospital
funding and private health insurance; improving rural
health; interface between aged and acute care; continuum
between preventative, primary, chronic and acute models
of care; improving indigenous health; improving mental
health; information technology, research and e-health;
quality and safety; and collaboration on workforce, train-
ing and education.
The reference groups were co-chaired by senior Govern-
ment officials and non-Government clinical experts
involving participants from the bureaucracies, people
who work in health agencies, and consumers. The refer-
ence groups created great expectations amongst the neo-
phyte health policy contributors who believed the
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rhetoric of the Commonwealth about being prepared to
consider wide ranging changes to the health sector.
Seasoned commentators also called for reform [2-4].
Although extensive reports were produced by the Refer-
ence Groups and delivered to the Health Ministers the
reports had no discernible impact on the 2003–2008
Agreements [5].
On 23 April 2003 the Commonwealth produced a non-
negotiable offer with severe penalty clauses if States
refused to sign by the Commonwealth's arbitrary deadline
of 31 August 2003. An Australian Health Reform Alliance
was formed to put pressure on the Commonwealth to
respond to the reference group reports and to attempt to
ensure that the 2003–2008 Agreements did not waste yet
another opportunity to improve the efficiency, equity and
quality of the health system. The Alliance's National
Health Summit, which met at Old Parliament House, pre-
sented its final communiqué to non-Government politi-
cians following a march up the hill to New Parliament
House [6]. The Commonwealth deadlines remained and
there was no change to the Agreement content.
The Commonwealth's confrontationalist stance effec-
tively destroyed relationships between the Minister for
Health and Ageing, Senator Kay Patterson, and her State
colleagues, and she was replaced as Health Minister by
Tony Abbott MP in the Ministerial reshuffle of October
2003.
The content of the Agreements
There have been five Health Care Agreements since Medi-
care was introduced in 1984. The emphasis, orientation
and priorities of these Agreements have changed over time
(see Table 1).
The most significant elements of the 2003–08 Agreements
are:
• a base grant which is increased for weighted population
increases, a further 1.7 per cent increase for utilisation
drift, and indexation for wage movements
• a withheld amount of 4 per cent of the grant paid on
compliance with reporting schedules and funding growth
matching requirements
• a capital funding scheme to facilitate improvements in
services involved in the transition from hospital to home
('Pathways Home Program')
• funding for palliative care, mental health, and safety and
quality initiatives.
The most contentious difference between the 1998–2003
and 2003–2008 Agreements related to the indexation pro-
visions (see Table 2 for significant areas of difference
between the two Agreements).
Each of the predecessor Agreements provided indexation
formulae to account for growth and ageing of the
population. The 1998–2003 Agreements also recognised
that there was further "utilisation drift", that is increases
in utilisation were occurring in the hospital sector over
and above that which can be explained by population
growth and ageing. This utilisation drift was in part the
result of new technologies that allowed for treatments for
Table 1: Key elements of Commonwealth-state hospital funding agreements
Agreement Political Objective Key Principles
1984–88 : Labor (Medicare Compensation 
Agreement)
Introducing Medicare Compensation for cost increases and revenue 
losses
1988–93 : Labor (Medicare Agreement) Consolidating Medicare
Growth and reform of public provision
Incentives for system reform
Penalties for lower public:private bed day 
shares and excess private medical service use
1993–98 : Labor (Medicare Agreement) Entrenching Medicare
Expansion of public provision
Reward for relatively higher levels of public 
provision and for increasing public provision 
relative to other states
Post 1996, accountability for negotiated 
outcomes
1998–2003 : Coalition (Australian Health Care 
Agreement)
Continuing with Medicare
Increased Commonwealth funding with 
increased accountability for states
Increased accountability on states for activity 
level changes
Increased clarity of Commonwealth 
responsibility if health insurance levels change
2003–08 : Coalition (Australian Health Care 
Agreement)
Continuing with Medicare
Slowed Commonwealth funding growth
Increased accountability for states
Improved reporting, including of state spending
Requirement on states at least to match
Commonwealth funding increases
Source: [11]Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2004, 1:5 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/1/1/5
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conditions for which there was previously no hospital
treatment. Utilisation also increased because of shifts in
treatment from general practitioners' rooms and other
ambulatory settings to same day hospital admission.
The 1998–2003 Agreements provided an escalation factor
of 2.1% per annum over and above the growth caused by
the increase in the rate of population for key elements of
the grant. The 2003–08 Agreements reduced the utilisa-
tion drift factor to 1.7% and narrowed the applicable
components of the grant, saving the Commonwealth
Government about $1 billion from that provided for in
the Forward Estimates. This reduction in growth provision
was vociferously opposed by States and also by clinicians
who were experiencing significant financial pressures on
hospitals as a result of State Government funding
constraints.
The 2003–08 Agreements also addressed an ongoing con-
cern of Commonwealth Governments (both Labor and
Coalition): its perception that when the Commonwealth
increased expenditure on hospital services, this often had
no discernible impact on hospitals as State Governments
withdrew funding concomitantly. As Deeble points out,
the reality is more complex, but the evidence is that an
increased Commonwealth share is associated with growth
in spending [7]. The new Agreements provided that the
States were required to increase their funding of hospitals
at the same rate as the Commonwealth increases, other-
wise the increases available to the State would not be paid.
Table 2: Comparison of provisions of 1989–2003 and 2003–08 Australian Health Care Agreements
Agreement Provision 1998–1998 Agreement 2003–2008 Agreement
Indexation 2.1% above weighted population growth applied to 83% of 
the grant
1.7% above weighted population growth applied to 71% of 
the grant
State matching Nil State "commits to increase its own source funding for 
public hospital services such that the cumulative rate of 
growth will at least match the cumulative rate of growth of 
Commonwealth funding" (Clause 11)
Scope and level of 
services
(State) "continues to provide services to public patients at 
an indicative public patient weighted separation rate of XX" 
(Clause 22)
"The range of services available to public patients should be 
no less than was available on 1 July 1998" (Clause 7(a))
Reform The Commonwealth and Victoria recognise the need for 
service delivery reform and ongoing exploration of 
additional initiatives under a measure and share model. 
Victoria will work with the Commonwealth in evaluating 
the outcomes from the Co-ordinated Care Trials to 
provide information to guide future directions for the 
reform of health service delivery.
The Commonwealth and Victoria will consider proposals 
which move funding for specific services between 
Commonwealth and State funded programs on the basis 
that each proposal meets the following criteria:
• the proposal must be consistent with accepted evidence 
based best practice care models;
• there should be a sound basis for believing that the reform 
will lead to improved patient outcomes and/or more cost 
effective care;
• the impact of the proposal should be measurable in terms 
of change in services delivered and costs to the health 
system as a whole and to each party to this Agreement;
• if the proposal is expected to lead to net savings, these 
should be shared equitably between the Commonwealth 
and Victoria;
• the proposal should have potential to be replicated, be on 
a scale such that extension can be realistically tested and be 
evaluated in terms of such extension; and
• the proposal must preserve eligible persons' current 
access to Medicare Benefits Schedule services or their 
equivalent.
Reform proposals may result in the cashing out of State 
funded programs and/or Commonwealth funded programs, 
including the Medicare Benefits Schedule and 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
Victoria and the Commonwealth are committed to working 
with other States to progress the reform agenda agreed by 
Commonwealth and State Ministers for Health on 27 
September 2002. The Commonwealth considers that for its 
part, such reform can taken place within existing funding 
parameters.
In line with clause 18, the specific areas of national co-
operation to deliver reform include:
(a) improving the interface between hospitals and primary 
and aged care services;
(b) achieving continuity between primary, community, 
acute, sub-acute, transition and aged care, whilst promoting 
consumer choice and improved responsiveness. Initial 
priorities for a stronger continuum of care approach will be 
cancer care and mental health services; and
(c) exploring setting up a single national system for 
pharmaceuticals across all settings.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2004, 1:5 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/1/1/5
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These stronger reporting frameworks built on the trend
from the previous agreements and responded to a critical
Auditor-General's report that concluded that the Com-
monwealth did not have all the performance information
required to administer the Commonwealth funding allo-
cated under the agreements [8].
The 'negotiation' processes
Why were the processes so acrimonious and what shaped
the Agreement outcome? To some extent the shape of the
2003–08 Agreement negotiations was inevitable. The
political context, where all state and territory governments
were of the opposite political colour from the Common-
wealth, meant that harmonious negotiations were proba-
bly never seriously in contemplation. Commonwealth
governments of both persuasions have tightened up
accountability on states with successive Agreements and
so tighter control was also probably inevitable. Two
important political choices did exacerbate the tensions
and inflamed the processes.
First, the 2003–08 framework was more parsimonious
than predecessor Agreements. As mentioned above, this
represented a saving to the Commonwealth of about $1
billion on the Forward Estimates. A contemporary politi-
cal issue was the decline in bulk billing. The Common-
wealth's response to this involved an injection of around
$1 billion. The link between the two policy debates within
the Health portfolio is clear. Cabinet probably judged the
political costs of finding a $1 billion saving from the states
as low, as state premiers complaining about Common-
wealth cuts and meanness is a regular part of the political
landscape. Further, States would probably have criticised
the Commonwealth position regardless of the offer made.
The second choice that shaped the process was the Com-
monwealth's intransigence after the drafts were released.
The Commonwealth's position here may have been based
on a recognition that, eventually, all the states would have
to sign the Agreements as they were politically committed
to Medicare and free access at point of admission to hos-
pitals, and that the states could not afford to suffer the
cash flow consequences announced by the Common-
wealth if the Agreements weren't signed by their deadline.
The Prime Minister probably took a strong hand in this
decision and left no room for his Health Minister to
manoeuvre. The Minister's failure to attend meetings exac-
erbated an already difficult situation.
A positive of the process was the extensive involvement of
practitioners in the lead-up to the draft Agreements
through the Reference Groups. Commonwealth-state
negotiations had hitherto been an arcane process involv-
ing bureaucratic insiders. This widening of participation
was welcomed by those involved and has set a precedent
for future negotiations.
Prospects for Reform
The 2003–08 Agreements commit the Commonwealth
and states to work towards reform in a number of areas
including the interface between hospitals, primary care,
and aged care; continuity of care particularly in cancer care
and mental health services; and continued work on phar-
maceuticals reform. A subtle shift from the predecessor
Agreement model is the more sceptical and parsimonious
approach to the potential for health care reform. Despite
the aspirations implicit in establishing the nine reference
groups, the language of the 2003–08 Agreements reflects
a much more hard-nosed approach to reform with a
strong emphasis on efficiency. This approach is most
clearly articulated in Clause 18: "The Commonwealth
considers that for its part such reforms can take place
within existing funding parameters".
Although predecessor Agreements also made provision
for reform to Commonwealth/State relations, the progress
in designing and implementing reform has not lived up to
expectations. The most important shift that occurred dur-
ing the course of the 1998–2003 Agreements was the
rationalisation of hospital provision of outpatient phar-
macy services, a long overdue response to a significant
frictional issue in Commonwealth/States relations [9,10].
It is unclear whether the dynamic, facilitatory aspects of
the 2003–08 Agreements will lead to any reform, espe-
cially given the acrimonious exchanges prior to signature
of the Agreements. However it is important to note that,
with a Federal election due at the end of 2004, there is a
possibility that a Labor Government will be administering
the remainder of the 2003–08 Australian Health Care
Agreement. A new Government may be more committed
to reforming and strengthening Medicare. However,
despite the fact that a Labor would then hold political
office throughout Australia, at all levels, this would not
necessarily presage a more laissez faire attitude by a federal
government to its state politically-allied counterparts. A
Commonwealth Labor government would be just as keen
as its Liberal predecessor to ensure that states are held
accountable for maintaining spending and access.
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